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POLITICAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS: ARTICLES 10, 11 AND 16 
OF THE ECHR AND ARTICLE 3 OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I 
Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, Associate Professor at the University of Reading (UK)  
1. Introduction and context 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) proclaims that ‘[d]emocracy is without doubt 
a fundamental feature of the European public order’.1 The Preamble to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) enunciates that ‘the maintenance and further 
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms are best ensured on the one hand by 
an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and 
observance of human rights’.2  
Democracy, however, does not exist in a vacuum. It is premised on the existence of a 
polity with members – the demos – by whom (and for whom?) democratic discourse with 
its many variants takes place.3 Hence, the determination that democracy is the only 
Convention-compatible system of governance does not in and of itself resolve the tension 
between, on the one hand, limitations of participation in democratic self-governance, 
deemed to be ‘fundamental to the definition of a political community’4 and critical for newly 
created polities5 and, on the other hand, the demands of (universal) human rights.6 In turn, 
the ECHR is silent on citizenship criteria,7 reserving it to the state’s domain,8 
notwithstanding its profound implications for political participation. 
                                                             
1 United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey, Application no. 19392/92 (ECtHR, 30 
January 1998), para 45.  
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 
1950, ETS no. 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
3 WEILER, To Be a European Citizen – Eros and Civilization (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy 
495, 503. 
4 JOHNSTONE, Outside Influence (2014) 13 Election Law Journal 117, 120. 
5 ZIEGLER, SHAW and BAUBÖCK (eds), Independence Referendums: Who Should Vote and Who Should 
be Offered Citizenship? (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies EUI, 2014). 
6 For a general discussion see PILDES, Supranational Courts and the Law of Democracy: The European 
Court of Human Rights (2017) Journal of Dispute Settlement 1. 
7 But see Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality, Strasbourg, 6 November 1997, ETS 
No 166, (entered into force 3 March 2000) esp. Art 6 (Acquisition of Nationality) (21 ratifications; 8 
signatures). 
8 DAY and SHAW, European Union Electoral Rights and the Political Participation of Migrants in Host 
Polities (2002) 8 International Journal of Human Geography 183, 187. 
 
 
The tension presents itself in respect of two interdependent aspects of political 
participation in a self-governing polity: political communication rights (freedoms of 
expression, assembly, and association, enunciated in Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, 
respectively) and electoral rights (pursuant to Article 3 of Additional Protocol 1, A3P1).9 
Member States’ general undertaking in Article 1 of the ECHR to ‘secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the [Convention] rights and freedoms’ is linguistically qualified in respect 
of Articles 10 and 11 by Article 16 (‘Restrictions on Political Activities of Aliens’), and in 
respect of A3P1 by the stipulation that elections should be held ‘under conditions which 
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people…’ (emphasis added). Notably, despite 
its ‘institutional’ language, Convention organs have consistently held that A3P1 entails 
individual rights to vote and to be elected (the ‘passive’ and ‘active’ elements thereof, 
respectively).10 
At this heart of this chapter’s analysis lies the function of, and relationship between, 
political communication rights and electoral rights; through an appraisal of ECHR 
jurisprudence, it considers the extent to which resident aliens should enjoy access to their 
Member State of residence’s Arendtian political space, where one’s opinions are significant 
and actions effective.11 If Council of Europe Member States may plausibly apply a citizenship 
qualification to participation in some or all of its electoral processes (predicated on a 
restrictive interpretation of ‘the people’ in A3P1), does that weaken or strengthen aliens’ 
claim to enjoy without discrimination political communication rights which fall short of 
decision-making? 
In Section 2, the chapter considers the potential effect (or lack thereof) of Article 16 of 
the ECHR as a ‘stop-gap’, permitting states to impose restrictions on aliens that are not 
mandated by Articles 10 and 11’s limitation clauses. It is suggested that Article 16 has fallen 
into desuetude, absent a single case where Convention organs applied it, with states 
generally choosing no longer to invoke its application to justify restrictions on Articles 10 
and 11. Nevertheless, the limited case law where the provision has been analysed suggests 
that citizens of the European Union (EU) residing in another EU Member State (referred to 
in EU law as Second Country Nationals) are differently situated than other resident aliens 
                                                             
9 Protocol No 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 20 March 1952, ETS No 9 (entered into force 18 May 1954). The undertaking to ‘hold free 
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot’ ipso facto imposes positive obligations on the state. 
See e.g. O’Connell, Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive 
obligations in a democracy (2010) 61 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 263.  
10 The leading case being Mathieu-Mohin v Belgium, Application no. 9267/81 (ECtHR, 2 March 1987), 
para 48–52. 
11 ARENDT, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, 1950) 296. 
 
 
as per their ‘alien’ designation, not least due to protection (pursuant to the EU legal order) 
of their electoral rights in local government (municipal) elections. 
In Section 3, the chapter investigates the reference to ‘the choice of the people’ in A3P1, 
noting the terminological difference between its stipulation and references to electoral 
rights of citizen(s) in international human rights treaties. The ECtHR has held that clauses 
that permit interference with Convention rights must be interpreted restrictively.12 
However, in appraising electoral exclusions of citizens, the ECtHR has not applied rigorous 
scrutiny to the identification of legitimate aims, absent a prescribed list; the Court has also 
extended a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ to Member States on questions of electoral 
eligibility.13 Critically for the purposes of this chapter, hitherto, the ECtHR has neither heard 
challenges to the near-universal exclusion of aliens from participation in national 
elections14 (the United Kingdom and Portugal have selective nationality-based 
enfranchisement regimes) nor to widespread exclusion of aliens from participation in sub-
national elections. Should such challenges arise, the rationale for selective enfranchisement 
will have to be properly scrutinised. 
Finally, in Section 4, the chapter appraises aliens’ political communication rights, 
pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. In light of sections 2 and 3, above, it is contended that 
across the Council of Europe (a) most aliens are denied most electoral rights; (b) restrictions 
on ‘political activities of aliens’ which fall short of electoral rights require independent 
justifications that meet the proportionality tests under those provisions, rather than by 
reliance on Article 16; and (c) prima facie prescribed limitations in Articles 10 and 11 do 
not distinguish between citizens and aliens (or indeed between different aliens).15 Absent a 
                                                             
12 See e.g. Stoll v Switzerland, Application no. 69698/01 (ECtHR, 10 December 2017), para 61. See 
also SCHABAS, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP, 2015) 509, noting 
that the ancestor of the restrictions and limitations clauses appears to be Article 29(2) of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, GA Res 217 A (III) (10 December 1948) (UDHR), which 
stipulates (in respect of the entire Declaration) that ‘[i]n the exercise of his rights and freedoms, 
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.’ 
13 For critique of ECtHR jurisprudence regarding convicts and non-residents, see ZIEGLER, Voting 
Eligibility: Strasbourg’s Timidity in ZIEGLER, WICKS and HODSON (eds), The United Kingdom and 
European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Hart, 2015) 165. Cf; Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Application nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06 (ECtHR, 22 December 2009), violation of 
A3P1 in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR in respect of Roma and Jewish BiH citizens who were not 
permitted to stand as candidate for the House of Peoples and the Presidency of BiH pursuant to the 
definition of the ‘constituent peoples’ of BiH. 
14 BECKMAN, Citizenship and Voting Rights: Should Resident Aliens Vote? (2006) 10 Citizenship Studies 
153, 153. 
15 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), notes in respect of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) 
 
 
vote, should aliens’ voice be limited, too, given its (intended) effects on voters? it could be 
argued that those political communication rights that are ‘related’ to democratic self-
governance should be subject to similar eligibility criteria.16 Conversely, for aliens, their 
exclusion from decision-making, coupled with their (non)security of residence, entails 
vulnerabilities which political communication rights may (partially) mitigate. It is also 
arguably important for citizens to be exposed to the full spectrum of views in order to 
facilitate informed decision-making.  
 
2. Article 16: stop-gap? 
ARTICLE 16 
Nothing in Articles 10, 11, and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties 
from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens. 
 
2.1. The potential scope of Article 16 
The effet utile (effectiveness) principle suggests that, Article 16 operates as an additional 
limitation to paragraph 2 of Articles 10 and 11; a contrario, it could serve to strengthen the 
claim that the latter clauses in and of themselves do not distinguish between citizens and 
aliens, pace Article 1 above. Article 16 refers to Article 14 (non-discrimination) without 
explicitly confining its imposition to restrictions imposed on aliens under Articles 10 and 
11. Notably, Article 14 is not a free-standing right: for a discrimination claim to be invoked, 
an issue must fall within the ambit of a Convention right.  
Article 16 was characterised by Schabas in his Commentary as an admissibility test, 
pursuant to which a CoE MS could object to an application on the grounds that the individual 
concerned is an ‘alien’.17 The provision does not refer to A3P1, given its later adoption, 
notwithstanding the a fortiori logical extension thereto. 
 
                                                             
(ICCPR) that ‘the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also 
be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, 
refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the 
jurisdiction of the State Party’. General Comment no. 31, The nature of the general legal obligations 
imposed on states parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 [10]. 
16 Compare: Bluman v Federal Election Comission, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 132 S. Ct. 
1087 (2012). 
17 Commentary (above no. 12) p. 606.  
 
 
2.2. Are second-country nationals ‘aliens’ in their country of residence? 
In Piermont v France,18 the majority ratio has effectively taken the view that Article 16 ECHR 
may not be invoked where a citizen of the Union seeks to exercise their rights under the 
Convention. France has prevented the applicant, Dorothée Piermont, a German national and 
a Member of the European Parliament (MEP), from re-entering French overseas territories 
in the South Pacific after she took part in demonstrations against the government in French 
Polynesia. France alleged that, the applicant was an alien within the meaning of Article 16 
ECHR, and therefore could not rely on the protections of Article 10.  
The Court considered that, while citizenship of the Union as such could not be relied on 
‘since the Community treaties did not at the time [1986] recognise any such citizenship’, the 
‘possession of the nationality of a Member State of the EU and (…) her status as an MEP do 
not allow Article 16 (…) to be raised against her, especially as the people of the overseas 
territories take part in European Parliament elections’.19 Based on this reasoning, in 2018, 
post-Maastricht, SCNs are not considered ‘aliens’ for the purposes of Article 16.20 Judges 
Ryssdal, Matscher, Sir John Freeland and Jungwiert, in a joint partly dissenting opinion, 
argued that Article 16 should have been regarded as having at least some relevance, since 
the applicant was clearly an alien in the eyes of French law, and therefore in the sense of 
Article 16.21 
In accordance with the principle of non-discrimination in EU law,22 EU citizens should 
enjoy municipal electoral rights under the same conditions as nationals of the Member State 
where they reside.23 Consequently, Second Country Nationals must be able to fully take part 
                                                             
18 Piermont v France, Application nos. 15773/89 and 15774/89 (ECtHR, 27 April 1995). 
19 Id [64]. 
20 See also Perincek v Switzerland, Application no. 27510/08 (ECtHR, 15 October 2015), noting pace 
Piermont that Article 16 could not be raised against a citizen of another EU Member State, but that it 
could not provide a justification for the interference in that case. 
21 Piermont v France, cit, para 4. The dissenting judges proceed to clarify that, even if Article 16 is 
relevant, it does not entail unfettered discretion of the host state to restrict on the political activity of 
an alien without contravention of Article 10. Id [5].  
22 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/47 (29 May 2008) (TFEU) Article 18 
(stipulating that ‘[w]ithin the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited (...)’) 
23 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 20.2(b); Directive 93/109/EC of 6 
December 1993, OJ L329/34 as amended by Council Directive 2013/1/EU of 20 December 2012, OJ 
L26/27; Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994, OJ L368/38. See also Explanations relating to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights OJ 303/17 (14 December 2007) (noting, regarding Article 52 thereof, 
that ‘[c]itizens of the European Union may not be considered as aliens in the scope of the application of 
Union law, because of the prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality. The limitations 
provided for by Article 16 of the ECHR as regards the rights of aliens therefore do not apply to them in 
this context.’).  
 
 
in the political life of their Member State of residence. Moreover, the nature of elections to 
the European Parliament means that, for effective democratic participation, political 
activities of Second Country Nationals both in their Member State of residence and in their 
Member State of nationality are critical on matters of common concern.24 Notions of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ in respect of Second Country Nationals are accordingly redefined.25  
Notably, the European Union’s Long-Term Residents Directive,26 amended in 2011 to 
extend its scope to eligible Beneficiaries of International Protection (persons granted 
refugee or subsidiary protection status, previously excluded therefrom)27 maintains the 
distinction between SCNs and Third Country Nationals regarding municipal electoral rights. 
A link was thus made between the EU ‘demos’ and the state of residence, not just for the 
purposes of citizen participation in the ‘democratic life of the Union’,28 where its 
applicability seems mandated, but also for participation in municipal elections, wherever 
they reside in the Union.  
 
2.3. Desuetude? 
In Piermont, the Commission stated that ‘those who drafted [Article 16] were subscribing 
to a concept that was then prevalent in international law, under which a general, unlimited 
restriction of political activities of aliens was thought legitimate’.29 Indeed, Article 16 dates 
to a time when it was considered legitimate to restrict the political activities of aliens 
generally. The underlying rationale was that these activities were apt to disrupt a state’s 
external relations. However, subsequent human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR,30 to 
which all Council of Europe Member States are parties,31 the American Convention on 
                                                             
24 Cox v Turkey, Application no. 2933/03 (ECtHR, 20 May 2010), where the court held that in 
questions of common European concern, the extent of political freedoms granted to a state ’s own 
nationals and to other Europeans must be the same. 
25 FINCK, Towards an Ever Closer Union between Residents and Citizens? (2015) 11 European 
Constitutional Law Review 78, 86. 
26 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 Concerning the Status of Third-Country 
Nationals who are Long-Term Residents, OJ L 16 (23 January 2004). 
27 Directive 2011/51/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011, OJ L132 (19 
May 2011).  
28 Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326 (26 October 2012) Article 10(3).  
29 Piermont v France, cit, (citing Commission Report A 314 (20 March 1995), para 58). 
30 Above no. 15.  
31 https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en  
 
 
Human Rights,32 the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights,33 and indeed the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU34 do not include similar provisions. 
It is also noteworthy that, Article 53 of the ECHR stipulates that ‘[n]othing in this 
Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party 
or under any other agreement to which it is a Party’. Given the absence of an Article 16 
equivalent in the ICCPR, it is hardly surprising that the provision has never been applied by 
the (former) Commission or the ECtHR and has arguably fallen into desuetude. Over four 
decades ago, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) called for 
proposals for repealing Article 16,35 though to-date its repeal has not materialised. 
It is instructive to consider cases where invocation of Article 16 could have been 
anticipated, such as the forced evacuation of the Saint-Bernard church in Paris ‘occupied’ by 
irregular migrants and their supporters;36 or the confiscation by Swiss authorities of an 
Algerian national’s means of communication in order to prevent him from spreading 
information about the pro-Algerian opposition party Front Islamique du Salut.37 A Greek 
court interpreting Article 16 noted that, the establishment of aliens’ associations should be 
allowed even if they relate to aliens’ political activity.38 In an English High Court case, an 
entry ban imposed by the Home Office on Louis Farrakhan, the American leader of the 
religious group ‘Nation of Islam’ was upheld as satisfying Article 10(2) proportionality 
between the aim of the prevention of disorder and freedom of expression. The Court 
dismissed Article 16 as ‘something of an anachronism half a century after the agreement of 
the Convention’.39 In Cox v Turkey, the ECtHR left a narrow window for future reference to 
Article 16. It held that, since the right to freedom of expression was guaranteed by Article 
10(1) ‘regardless of frontiers’, no distinction could be drawn between its exercise by 
                                                             
32 22 November 1969 (entered into force 18 July 1978).  
33 27 June 1981, 21 ILM 58 (1982). 
34 OJ C 326 (26 October 2012). 
35 PACE, Recommendation No 799 (15 January 1977) on the Political Rights and Position of ‘Aliens’ 
[10]. It also advocated the ‘the establishment, where appropriate, of consultative councils to represent 
the views of aliens at the level of local authorities’. 
36 Cissé v France, Application no. 51346/99 (ECtHR, 9 April 2002). 
37 Zaoui v Switzerland, Application no. 41615/98 (ECtHR, 18 January 2001). 
38 MAVRODI, The Impact of the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights on the Rights of Third Country Nationals in Greece (2008) 22 Journal of Immigration 
Asylum and Nationality Law 45, text next to notes 48–51. 




nationals and foreigners; hence, Article 16 should be construed as only capable of 
authorising restrictions on ‘activities’ that directly affect the ‘political’ process.40  
Given the above, direct reliance on Article 16 in future appears unlikely. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the provision has lost its broader currency, as an implicit 
(background) consideration for states, facilitated by its retention in the Convention text and 
the inexact (open-ended?) nature of several limitation grounds in Articles 10(2) and 11(2). 
 
3. Article 3 Additional Protocol I 
ARTICLE 3 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret 
ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature. 
 
3.1. ‘The opinion of the people’ 
Article 25 of the ICCPR proclaims that ‘every citizen’ shall have the ‘right to vote and to be 
elected by genuine periodic elections’,41 permitting (though by no means requiring) states 
to apply citizenship voting qualifications.42 In its General Comment No 25,43 the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) contrasted ‘the right to participate in public affairs’ with ‘other 
rights and freedoms recognised by the Covenant (which are ensured to all individuals 
within the territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the state)’, noting the explicit reference 
to ‘citizen’.44 As noted above, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU similarly refers to 
citizens’ electoral rights regarding the European Parliament. 
In contradistinction, the (earlier and non-binding) UDHR stipulates in Article 21 that 
‘[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives’. The same terminology appears in the ICCPR in respect of ‘the 
                                                             
40 Cox v Turkey, cit, para 31. 
41 See also American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) Article 2 African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 21 ILM 1982 (entered into force 21 October 1986) Article 
12. 
42 For discussion of citizenship voting qualifications, see ZIEGLER, Voting Rights of Refugees 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017) ch 2. 
43 General Comment no. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal 
access to public service (Art. 25) (57th session, 12 July 1995).  
44 Id [3]. 
 
 
right to enter his own country’,45 which the HRC has interpreted as ‘not limited to nationality 
in a formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at birth or by conferral; it embraces, at the 
very least, an individual who, because of his or her special ties to or claims in relation to a 
given country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien’.46 
Could the reference in A3P1 to the ‘the opinion of the people’ rather than to citizens 
facilitate inquiry, in appropriate cases, into exclusion of (some or all) aliens from 
participation in (some or all) electoral processes? In respect of deportations, the court has 
accepted that the ‘preferential treatment’ of citizens of other EU Member States is based on 
an objective and reasonable justification, ‘given that the Member States of the European 
Union form a special legal order, which has, in addition, established its own citizenship’.47 
Would the ECtHR accept a similar rationale in respect of the electoral exclusion of Third 
Country Nationals from electoral participation, were it be challenged on the basis that ‘the 
people’ in such Council of Europe Member States appear to include (some) non-citizens? 
 
3.2. Enfranchisement of (some) aliens in sub-national (local) elections 
In a resolution prior to the Maastricht treaty,48 the European Parliament noted that ‘[t]he 
cornerstone of democracy is the right of voters to elect the decision-making bodies of 
political assemblies at regular intervals. If the right to vote is to be truly universal, it must 
be granted to all residents of the territory concerned (…) universality, in the original sense 
of the word, would imply that all residents irrespective of nationality are included in the 
electorate.’49  
In parallel to the enfranchisement of Second Country Nationals in municipal elections 
in their EU Member State of residence pace Maastricht, 1992 saw several Council of Europe 
Member States ratifying the Convention on Political Participation of Foreigners on the Local 
Level.50 The professed aim of this treaty is ‘to improve integration of foreign residents into 
                                                             
45 ICCPR (above no. 15) art 12(4). 
46 General Comment Application no. 27: Freedom of movement (Art. 12) (2 November 1999), 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 [20]. 
47 C. (Chorfi) v Belgium, Application no. 21794/93 (ECtHR, 7 August 1996), para 38; see also 
Moustaquim v Belgium, Application no. 12313/86 (ECtHR, 18 February 1991), para 49. 
48 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992, OJ C 191 
(29 July 1992). 
49 European Parliament, Voting Rights in Local Elections for Community Nationals Residing in Member 
States other than their own, COM(86)487 final at 11. 
50 Strasbourg, 5 February 1992, ETS no. 144 (entered into force 1 May 1997) Article 6(1).  
 
 
the local community (…) by enhancing the possibilities for them to participate in local public 
affairs.’51 Contracting Parties undertake to grant to ‘every foreign resident’ who has been a 
habitual and lawful resident for five years preceding the date of the election ‘the right to 
vote and to stand in local authority elections’.52  
In 2001, PACE recommended that Council of Europe Member States ‘grant the right to 
vote and stand in local elections to all migrants legally established for at least three years 
irrespective of their origin’ as well ‘promote the action of migrants’ organisations and 
associations and encourage the networking of their activities’. It also called on them to ratify 
the abovementioned treaty.53 A 2005 PACE resolution stipulated that ‘[t]he right to vote and 
to stand as candidates in local elections should therefore be granted to all legal residents 
having lived long enough in the country, regardless of their nationality or ethnic origin.’54 
Nevertheless, despite the passage of time, and notwithstanding the consequences of 
Maastricht, only a small minority of Council of Europe Member States have ratified the 
treaty,55 and many EU Member States retain selective enfranchisement that meet (just) their 
EU law obligations.  
It is instructive to compare the position under the Convention on the Rights of Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families, which entered into force in 2002.56 Migrant 
workers and members of their families ‘shall have the right to participate in public affairs 
of their State of origin and to vote and to be elected at elections of that State’.57 In 
contradistinction, they ‘may enjoy political rights in the State of employment if that State, in 
the exercise of its sovereignty, grants them such rights’.58 The stipulation does not 
distinguish between levels of governance, emphasising whilst international human rights 
law does not generally require states to enfranchise aliens, they are permitted (perhaps 
even encouraged) to do so. 
 
                                                             
51 Id, Preamble.  
52 Id Art. 6.0. 
53 See e.g. PACE Recommendation 1500 (26 January 2001), Participation of immigrants and foreign 
residents in political life in the Council of Europe member states [11].  
54 PACE, Resolution 1459 (2005) Abolition of restrictions on the right to vote [5]. 
55 Ratifications: Albania, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden. Signatures: Cyprus, Lithuania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom. 
56 General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990 (entered into force 1 July 2003). 
57 Id Art. 41. 
58 Id Art. 42(3). 
 
 
3.3. Can electoral exclusion of aliens be challenged in future ECtHR case law?  
In additional to national elections, the ECtHR has considered elections to the devolved 
administrations in the United Kingdom (the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and 
the Northern Irish Assembly) to fall within the ambit of A3P1 qua ‘the choice of the 
legislature’,59 given their law-making powers. The ECtHR has similarly applied A3P1 
scrutiny to the franchise in EP elections.60 In contrast, referendums generally fall outside of 
the ambit of the provision.61  
Given that the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, EU Member States are not longer 
required by EU law to enfranchise their resident United Kingdom citizens qua their 
‘relegation’ to Third Country Nationals status.Nevertheless, persons who have been 
exercising both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ electoral rights prior to the UK’s departure may 
challenge their disenfranchisement, given that exclusion and non-inclusion are 
distinguishable.62 Such challenges may be reviewed sucject to the general standard that the 
ECtHR has applied to restrictions or limitations on the right to vote , namely that they ‘do 
not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and 
deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and 
that the means employed are not disproportionate’.63  
 
4. Articles 10 & 11: political communication rights 
ARTICLE 10 
                                                             
59 See e.g. McHugh and others v the United Kingdom, Application no. 51987/08 (ECtHR, 10 February 
2015). 
60 See e.g. Matthews v the United Kingdom, Application no. 24833/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999) [52–
54] (describing the European Parliament as ‘represent[ing] the principal form of democratic, political 
accountability in the Community system’, deriving ‘democratic legitimation from the direct elections by 
universal suffrage’). 
61 Mclean and Cole v the United Kingdom, Application nos. 12626/13 and 2522/12 (ECtHR, 26 June 
2013). 
62 See ZIEGLER, Written evidence (UK House of Lords’ EU (Justice) sub-committee ‘Brexit: citizens’ 
rights inquiry’, 24 November 2017); available at: 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/eu-justice-
subcommittee/inquiries/parliament-2017/brexit-citizens-rights/. See also Mini-symposium on EU 








1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
ARTICLE 11 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the 
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, 
of the police or of the administration of the State. 
4.1. The mutually reinforcing political dimension of Articles 10 and 11 
The ECtHR has held that ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations 
of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual’s 
self-fulfilment’.64 In turn, protection of opinions and the freedom to express them within the 
meaning of Article 10 of the Convention is one of the objectives of the freedoms of assembly 
and association enshrined in Article 11.65 Article 11 protects peaceful assembly and 
association, which share the objective of allowing individuals to come together for the 
expression and protection of their common interests. The ECtHR held that ‘participation of 
citizens in the democratic process is to a large extent achieved through belonging to 
associations in which they may integrate with each other and pursue common objectives 
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collectively’.66 Therefore, the function of Article 11 freedoms is central to the effective 
working of the democratic system. It is hardly surprising that Article 11 has been 
interpreted in conjunction with Article 10,67 and vice versa.68  
The court has interpreted political rights to include positive obligations to ‘guarantee 
rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective’69 not least given the 
observation that the rights enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 are essential for effective 
exercise of electoral rights. Such positive obligations are ‘of particular importance for 
persons holding unpopular views or belonging to minorities, because they are more 
vulnerable to victimisation’.70 
As per the ECtHR’s jurisprudential practice, it places the initial onus on the applicant to 
demonstrate that one or more of the rights in Articles 10 and 11 has been infringed. It then 
proceeds to query the State’s justifications, namely whether the limitation is pursuant to 
one or more of the prescribed grounds, and whether it is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
The ECtHR held that, in determining necessity in respect of political activities (generally), 
Council of Europe Member States have a limited margin of appreciation,71 which goes hand 
in hand with rigorous European supervision,72 and narrow scope for subsidiarity.73  
None of the prescribed grounds in both provisions address themselves specifically to 
aliens. Indeed, notably, Articles 10 and 11 do not distinguish between transient non-
citizens, long-term residents, and permanent residents; or between asylum-seekers, 
recognised refugees, and other migrants. Hence, distinctions between non-citizens must be 
objectively justified, rather than assumed.74 Would the distinction drawn above between 
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SCNs and other aliens in those Council of Europe Member States that are also EU Member 
States also justify differential treatment in respect of Articles 10 and 11 rights? Does the 
(political) predicament of recognised refugees uniquely situate them as persons requiring 
(political communication) remedies? 
The HRC’s approach in General Comment Application no. 1575 provides a helpful 
context. The HRC asserts that ‘[a]liens (…) have the right to (…) hold opinions and to express 
them. Aliens receive the benefit of the right of peaceful assembly and of freedom of 
association (...) [t]here shall be no discrimination between aliens and citizens in the 
application of these rights.’76 The following sections query the applicability of this 
(unqualified) statement. 
 
4.2. A (political) voice without a vote?   
The right to vote plays both expressive (manifestation of non-domination and self-
governance) and instrumental (as a means for protecting individual interests and 
expressing preferences) roles.77 If aliens are excluded from electoral participation, the 
question is whether the state may restrict their engagement in other political activities to 
try to persuade citizens how to use their voting power, given that such restrictions 
aggravate the expressive effects of disenfranchisement. As the HRC states in its General 
Comment no. 34, ‘[f]reedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable 
conditions for the full development of the person and constitute the foundation stone for 
every free and democratic society.’78 
Lardy argues that the restriction on the free speech of ‘aliens’ is related to the goal of 
limiting the active participation of non-citizens in political life, the same aim which 
underlies the denial of the right to vote.79 In the United States, Congress banned ‘a 
contribution or donation of money or other thing of value in connection with a Federal, 
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State, or local election’ to election campaigns by non-citizens80 except when made by lawful 
permanent residents.81 The ban was upheld by the Federal District Court in Washington 
D.C., which analogised participation in electoral campaigns to other activities that may be 
limited to American citizens, such as voting, serving on a jury, working as a police officer, or 
being a teacher in a public (state-maintained) school.82 The Court held that, while the U.S. 
‘does not bar foreign nationals from issue advocacy’83 it ‘has a compelling (…) in limiting the 
participation of foreign citizens in activities of American democratic self-government’.84 
In contrast, it could be argued that freedoms of expression, assembly, and association 
function within liberal democracies to address deficiencies within the functioning of the 
democratic processes. Those rights serve to protect the political freedoms of individuals 
against the potential incursions of electoral majorities and their chosen governors. They 
mitigate those features of the electoral system which tend to place certain groups – and the 
corresponding electoral minorities – under threat. If aliens are denied a vote, at least they 
can try to persuade voters. As Aleinikoff puts it, ‘[A]re not those in the outer rings of 
membership arguably in need of greater protection because they are not permitted to 
participate in the political process and traditionally have been the subjects of 
discriminatory legislation?’85 While other voters can advocate on their behalf, such 
advocacy is more abstract and reinforces a power hierarchy, privileging one person while 
stripping the person who is directly affected of his or her voice.86 
Council of Europe Member States that are signatories to the Convention on 
Participation of Foreigners undertake to guarantee the right to freedom of expression and 
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others to 
foreigners on the same terms as to nationals.87 Aliens also have the right to form local 
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associations of their own for purposes of mutual assistance, maintenance and expression of 
their cultural identity or defence of their interests. Consider the role performed by EU27 
citizens in the United Kingdom in discussions concerning the protection of their rights 
following the outcome of the 23rd June 2016 referendum on the United Kingdom’s EU 
membership, notwithstanding the fact that most EU27 citizens were excluded from the 
referendum franchise and, indeed, are excluded from the general election franchise.88 Such 
political activities involve establishing pressure groups,89 documenting anxiety and 
uncertainty with a view to influencing decision-makers,90 and making appearances in 
Parliamentary committees.91 
The ECtHR found a violation of the right to peaceful assembly in Article 11 arising from 
repeated denial of travel authorisation to a Turkish Cypriot wishing to cross into southern 
Cyprus, impeding his participation in bi-communal meetings with Greek Cypriots, and 
‘preventing him from engaging in peaceful assembly with people from both communities’.92 
 
4.3. The effect of aliens’ political activities on citizens qua voters 
It could be argued that, ‘voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in 
order to determine how to cast their votes’93 Seen from this perspective, political 
communication rights of aliens are instrumental – for citizens. Indeed, the abovementioned 
activities of EU27 citizens (and of the TRNC national) arguably serve a dual function. In a 
democracy, it is essential that voters hear directly from (all) those affected by a public 
policy.  
Compare Bluman with French legislation prohibiting the French ‘branch’ of the Basque 
party from receiving funding from its Spanish counterpart, The ECtHR held that, prohibition 
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on the funding of political parties by foreign political parties may have a significant impact 
on an association’s financial resources and hence its ability to engage fully in its political 
activities.94 On the merits, the ECtHR noted that, the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe95 had expressed support for prohibitions on funding of political parties by foreign 
sources, and that there was no European consensus on this matter; hence, it held that the 
prohibition was not in and of itself incompatible with Article 11.96 It noted that ‘a certain 
degree of “intrusion” by such parties into the political life of other EU Member States may 
appear consistent with the logic of European integration…' but held that ‘it is not for the 
Court to interfere in matters relating to the compatibility of a member State’s domestic law 
with the EU project.’97 
 
4.4. Voice and exit 
Typically, concern about free speech focuses on forms of prior restraint before speech or 
criminal punishment or civil liability after expressive activity. But, as Kagan notes, aliens 
have a unique vulnerability that does not affect citizens: they lack permanent security of 
residence. Ultimately, the state reserves itself the right to control the entry, residence and 
expulsion of aliens.98 The potential threat of deportation may have a chilling effect on aliens’ 
speech, especially when it critiques state authorities, even when, prima facie, the law does 
not limit their political communication rights.99  
Elsewhere,100 I argue that recognised refugees101 are a special category of non-citizen 
residents in need of (full) membership in a political community for an indeterminate ex ante 
unknown period of time; and that it is therefore desirable (de lege ferenda) that they be 
treated by their countries of asylum as if they were their citizens in respect of entitlements 
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which, under international law, may be subject to a citizenship qualification – including the 
right to vote.  
The normative case that I make for enfranchisement applies a fortiori to other political 
activities of refugees.102 It may be hoped that, in 2021, Arendt’s dim observation that 
refugees ‘never banded together, as the minorities had done temporarily, to defend common 
interests’103 requires qualification. Yet, the practical challenges for refugees wanting to 
undertake political activities in their state of asylum are considerable. Even though 
‘recognition of (…) refugee status does not (…) make [a person] a refugee but declares him 
to be one’,104 the decision on which persons come within the ambit of international 
protection is made by a state, not the refugee – and so is the decision to cease refugee 
status.105  
Refugees may be deterred from voicing their grievances, fearing backlash or 
vindication of local population fears. Indeed, while in terms of vulnerability caused by high 
‘exit’ costs, the predicament of refugees is far greater than that of, for instance, a citizen of 
one EU member State residing in another EU Member State, the ability of the latter to make 
use of political communication rights is facilitated by security of residence. 
 
5. Conclusion   
This chapter explored how Article 16 of the ECHR, designed in post-war Europe to facilitate 
restrictions on political communication rights of ‘aliens’, has fallen into desuetude. While 
the Court has decided voting eligibility cases regarding, inter alia, convicts, non-resident 
citizens, and persons with mental disabilities, it has not considered the (arguable) 
anomalies arising from divergent eligibility practices in respect of aliens across the Council 
of Europe and their (in)compatibility with the phrase ‘the people’ in A3P1. Meanwhile, in 
Article 16’s jurisprudential absence, the Court does not appear to have explicitly dealt with 
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two substantive queries regarding the application of Articles 10 and 11: first, the extent to 
which it would be justified to distinguish between different political communication rights, 
based on the extent to which they affect and/or are related to democratic self-governance. 
Second, the extent to which it would be justified to distinguish between aliens based on their 
immigration status. It is hoped that further exploration of such questions will be 
undertaken.  
 
 
 
